/ 
The facts: 90 seconds to impact
Leaving at 10:51pm after a dinner in town, the tender was travelling at around 28 knots along the western shore of the port of Göcek. Thirty seconds later, it approached the port stern of the Vega this was a RIB that was stationary, with its navigation lights off, but with the all-round white anchor light on, and threw the helmsman into the water.
The second passenger, trapped under the tender's hull, died of trauma associated with drowning. The MAIB points to unplanned navigation, carried out at night, in excess of the port authority's newly-recalled speed limits (10 knots in the outer harbor, 6 knots in the coves).
Speed, alcohol, night vision: a deleterious triptych
The investigation found that speed was incompatible with an effective lookout, especially in a body of water saturated with background light, and pointed out that alcohol impairs peripheral vision, the recovery of scotopic vision and reaction times. Five hours after the accident, the tender driver's alcohol level still exceeded the UK legal limit (0.25 mg/l of air). In addition, the tender crossed two shoals indicated on the on-board chart plotter (not used), confirming a night-time dead reckoning of âeuros and the absence of an elementary risk assessment.
RIB lighting: compliant but vulnerable
On the Vega the all-round white light met the regulations (COLREG 23/25) for a small stationary vessel, but its low elevation and luminous background reduced the equipment's effectiveness. The choice of drifting with the sidelights off, close to a busy thoroughfare, increased exposure to risk. The MAIB notes that the helmsman, although qualified, had far too little time to relaunch and maneuver.
Hierarchy on board not respected
The yacht operator's SMS (Safety Management System) prohibited alcohol for the operating crew, but did not explicitly regulate the recreational use of tender. Above all, the roles and powers of crew members were not defined, making the captain's authority difficult to impose. As a result, there was no opposition to a quick night out, after alcohol consumption, in a highly restricted area. Since then, the operator has revised its SMS to include rules dedicated to night tenders, and the owner has clarified the letter of delegation to the captain.
Responses from the authorities: speed reminders, traffic light controls
Three days before the accident, the harbour master's office had notified the limitations; after the event, it announced that it was stepping up inspections of navigation lighting. Internal corrective measures (night tender policy, clarification of responsibilities) satisfy the MAIB, which makes no further recommendations.
There are a number of operational lessons to be learned for superyachts and charters:
- Plan every tender transit, even short ones, with route, danger points and speed ceiling adapted to COLREG and local advice. Pilot with plotter/ARPA/AIS in addition to visual watch, especially at night with luminous backgrounds.
- Zero drinking and driving, with no recreational exceptions: align drug/alcohol policy with all appendage uses, crew and owner's representatives alike.
- Clarify the chain of command: mission letters and SMS must establish the captain's ultimate authority
- Raising the conspicuity of small stationary units: all-round light on telescopic mast, spot work light if authorized, vest worn at night, VHF/DSC or at least an early warning system.
This accident is not an "exotic case" from Turkey: it ticks all the classic boxes for dinghy accidents âeuros speed, alcohol, night-time cruising and failure to use on-board cartographyâeuros and a frequent blind spot on superyachts: the ambiguous status of tenders "to go out for dinner or a drink". Updating the SMS, clarifying the captain's powers and reminding him of port limitations are essential safety measures. The real challenge, however, remains cultural: to treat tenders as vessels subject to the same operational standards as the mother yacht, and not simply as courtesy cabs.
